Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

The State of Utah v. Tommy Glen Carter : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee; Christine Soltis; Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant; Wayne A. Freestone; Parker, Freestone & Angerhofer.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Carter, No. 970038 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/639

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAMCOU

Wayne A. Freestone, #4481
PARKER, FREESTONE, ANGERHOFER & HARDING
Bank One Tower
50 West 300 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
801-328-5600

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
•A10
DOCKET NO. 3

R
B |^
BR,EF

APPEAL

iDh'

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
*

Appellate No.: 970038-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee
*

vs.
TOMMY GLEN CARTER,

*

Priority NO.:

2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT TOMMY GLEN CARTER
Trial Court:
Case No.:
Presiding Judge:

Third District Court, Salt Lake County
961901340FS
Kenneth Rigtrup

Attorney for Plaintiff?Appellee

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

Christine Soltis
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 140854
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Wayne A. Freestone
PARKER, FREESTONE, ANGERHOFER
& HARDING
50 West 300 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Wayne A. Freestone, #4481
PARKER, FREESTONE, ANGERHOFER & HARDING
Bank One Tower
50 West 300 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
801-328-5600
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
*

Appellate No.: 970038-CA

PlaintiffAppellee
*

TOMMY GLEN CARTER,

*

Priority NO.

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT TOMMY GLEN CARTER
Trial Court:
Case No.:
Presiding Judge:

Third District Court, Salt Lake County
961901340FS
Kenneth Rigtrup

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

Christine Soltis
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 140854
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Wayne A. Freestone
PARKER, FREESTONE, ANGERHOFER
& HARDING
50 West 300 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE

PAGE NO.

Table of Authorities

ii

Statement of Jurisdiction

1

Statement of the Issue Presented For Review and Standard of Review

•

1

Determinative Provisions

1

Statement of Case

2

Statement of Relevant Facts

3

Summary of Argument

5

Argument

6

Conclusion

10

Certificate of Mailing

12

Exhibit 1

13

i

Cases

Page No,

State vs. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408 (Utah 1993)

State vs. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App. 1993

1

6,7,10

State vs. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386,1387 (Utah 1988

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISTONS AND STATUTES
4

^ . Section 78-2^-3(2)(e)

1

i tan i.ode Ann. Section 77-l|8a-l(l)(a)

1

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant/Appellant Tommy Glen Carter ("Carter") hereby appeals to the Utah Court of
Appealsfromthefinalcriminal judgment and conviction rendered against him on the 30th day of
December, 1996, by the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, convicting him of theft from a person, a second-degree
felony. This Court has jurisdiction over Carter's appeal pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2)(a),
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(a) and 78-2a-3(2)(e), whereby an appealfromthe court of record
in a criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appealsfromafinalorder for anything
other than afirstdegree or capital felony.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue
Carter raises on primary issue for appeal: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in
denying a motion for continuance of the trial based upon the need to investigate newly discovered
evidence?

Standard of Review
This Court reviews a denial of a motion for continuance based upon newly discovered
evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Cabututan 861 P.2d 408 (Utah 1993).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no statutory provisions which are determinative in this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from afinaljudgment and conviction rendered on December 30,1996 in

the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, convicting Carter of theft from a person, a second degree felony.

n.

Cows*? of the Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court
On June 27,1996, the police arrested Carter and codefendant Kenneth B. Ellis ("Ellis")

for theft from a person. The victim and key witness was Joshua Irvin ("Irvin"). At the
arraignment on August 12, 1996, Carter entered a plea of not guilty. The matter was set for jury
trial on November 19 and 20, 1996. On the morning of November 20, Ellis's counsel received
information on a witness who had been unknown to either defendant, codefendant or the State
prior to the start of the trial. Ellis's counsel received the court's permission to interview the
witness before the proceedings began and when she returned, a hearing was held in chambers on
both counsels' motion to continue the trial while they investigated the possibility of obtaining
evidencefromthe witness. The court denied the motion for continuance and on November 21,
1996, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of theft from a person, a second degree felony. Carter
made a motion for sentencing under the next lower category of offense but this motion was also
denied by the Court. Carter was sentenced on December 30, 1996 to a prison term of 1 to 15
years at the Utah State Prison.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On June 27, 1996, Joshua Irvin was taking a bus homefromwork. He testified that he
exited the bus to make a transfer to another bus in the vicinity of North Temple and West Temple.
He testified that because he had some time to kill before the next bus arrived, he walked toward a
Circle K to get a soda. (Tr. at 3:10-12) He checked his pockets to see what money he had and
found some bills and change which he separated and returned to his pockets. He stated that the
bills totaled approximately $12, which consisted of a $10 bill and some ones. (Tr. at 4:8-12) As
Irvin continued walking to the Circle K, he reported being bumped and saw Carter emptying the
contents of his pocket that held the bills. (Tr. at 6:21-24) Irvin reported that codefendants Carter
and Ellis started to run away. Irvin then called police who found Carter and Ellis a few blocks
away, sitting on the grass near the Greyhound bus station. (Tr. at 13:4-12). Irvin had followed
the police to the scene where he gave a positive identification of the suspects. (Tr. at 14:17-20).
At this time during the trial, the state asked Irvin if he had ever talked to Carter or Ellis
about purchasing drugsfromthem. Irvin denied having done so. (Tr. at 15:6-15). On cross
examination, counsel questioned Irvin regarding his use or purchase of marijuana. Irvin denied
asking Carter to help him purchase marijuana. He denied that he was in the habit of purchasing
marijuana and in fact, he did not use marijuana. (Tr. at 25:14-24).
Carter also testified regarding what happened with Irvin on June 27. Carter states that he
took a bus to Crossroads Plaza and was waiting infrontof Nordstrom's when he bumped into
Ellis, afriendhe had not seen for some time. (Tr. at 139:13-25). After chatting with Ellis for
awhile, Carter noticed Irvin looking around "like he was in the market for something." (Tr. at
140:16-22). Carter approached Irvin and asked him, "Are you looking for anything?" to which
3

Irvin replied, "Well, maybe a little bit of weed, marijuana." (Tr. at 141:9-13). Carter then stated
that he suggested to Irvin that they go around the corner to exchange some money and discuss the
matter further. (Tr. at 141:22-25). At this time, Ellis reached into his pocket and gave Carter
$13 which Carter then pocketed. (Tr. at 142:22-25, 143:1-2). Carter then proceeded to walk
with Irvin to afriend'shouse to purchase the marijuana because Carter did not have any
marijuana with him. (Tr. at 143:11-18). During the walk, Irvin kept asked Carter how much
further they had to go and Carter replied only a few more blocks. (Tr. at 144:6-21). According
to Carter, Irvin got mad and said, "I know what you guys are going to do." (Tr. at 144:23-25).
Then he turned around and said, 'Til get you niggers" and ran off. (Tr. at 145:1-2). It was after
this that Irvin apparently called the police, as stated in thefirstparagraph of this fact section.
Carter also testified that he had stepped awayfromEllis when he spoke to Irvin about
purchasing drugs and that Ellis had no idea what had transpired between the two and never found
out until after they were arrested. (Tr. at 149:14-19; Tr. at 150:16-21). Ellis corroborated this
testimony. (Tr. at 209:16-19). Ellis further testified that from a distance he had seen Irvin give
Carter some cash. (Tr. at 210:11-19).
The trial began on November 19, 1996. After having impaneled the jury and completing
opening statements, the matter was set to reconvene on November 20, 1996. After their court
appearance, Carter and codefendant Ellis were returned to their jail cells. Before they were
returned to the courtroom the next morning, Ellis conversed with an inmate, Brian Meek, in the
jail who indicated he knew the victim, Joshua Irvin. (Supp. Tr. 2 & 3) The inmate also indicated
that he had seen Mr. Irvin use illegal drugs and hadfriendsthat Mr. Irvin owed money for drugs
he had obtained. (Supp. Tr. 3 & 4) This information was conveyed to Ellis's attorney
4

immediately after Ellis was returned to the courtroom on the morning of November 20. Ellis's
counsel informed Carter's counsel and a hearing was requested of Judge Rigtrup which was held
in chambers. In this hearing, Ellis's counsel requested some time before the proceedings begin to
interview this newly discovered witness at the jail. Judge Rigtrup granted her motion. Then,
Ellis's counsel went to the jail and personally interviewed the inmate who confirmed the substance
of Ellis's conversation with the inmate.
Upon counsel's return, a hearing was again held in chambers on both counsels' motion to
continue the trial in order to investigate the possibility of obtaining new evidence and verifying the
veracity of the evidence of illegal drug use by Irvin. The court denied the motion for continuance,
(Supp. Tr. 3 & 4) forcing the codefendants to present their defense without the benefit of what
may have been material and substantial evidence of their innocence. The testimony of this inmate,
in the event that it were verified, may have led to admissible evidence to impeach Irvin's
accusations that Carter took moneyfromIrvine's pocket. It may have been used to attack Mr.
Irvine's statement that he did not use marijuana and was not in the habit of buying marijuana.

SUMMARY OFTOEARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Carter's motion for continuance after
thefirstday of the trial. Carter requested the continuance because a witness had been discovered
after the trial had begun. This witness, Brian Meek, an inmate at the jail, knew Irvin personally
and could testify to the fact that Irvin had a practice of using and possibly buying illegal drugs.
This testimony would lend credibility to Carter's defense that Irvin had approached him to
purchase marijuana and had actually handed money to Carter for this purchase. Irvin, on the
other hand, has claimed that Carter stole the moneyfromhim. Furthermore, such evidence could
5

be used to attack Mr. Irvin's credibility.
The courts have set a standard that must be met when a continuance, based on newly
discovered evidence, is requested. The defendant must show that the testimony is material and
admissible, that the witness can be procured within a reasonable time, and that due diligence was
exercised by counsel in preparing the case so the witness was not someone that counsel
overlooked when preparing for trial. Carter had met this standard yet the trial court still denied a
continuance. For the trial court to do so, was an abuse of the court's discretion and the trial
court's action should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
I.

CARTER MEETS THE STANDARD OF MOVING FOR CONTINUANCE AND WAS
MATERIALLY PREJUDICED BY THE DENIAL OF CONTINUANCE IN THAT THE
ADMISSION OF THIS EVIDENCE MAY HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE IN THE
JURY'S VERDICT.
When the trial court denied Carter's motion for continuance, Carter was unable to procure

the testimony of a witness or witnesses that may have led to impeachment of Irvin's accusations
that the defendant took the moneyfromIrvin's pocket and his claim that he did not use marijuana.
This evidence could have made a crucial difference in whether or not the jury would have returned
a guilty verdict for Carter. State v. Horton 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) sets forth the
standard a criminal defendant must meet when moving for a continuance. In Hodon, the court
denied the defendant's motion for continuance, holding that an alibi witness' surgery did not
entitle defendant to continuance of trial. Even though this particular witness could not be present
at the trial, her testimony was presented at trial through the reading of her deposed statement.
Consequently, the defendant was not prevented from obtaining or presenting evidence material to
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his case. Rather, he was simply limited to presenting her testimony through the reading of her
deposition rather than having her testify in person. Therefore, the defendant did not really need a
continuance because he was still able to present the evidence material to his case.
Horton sets out a standard that the defendant must meet when moving for a continuance.
First, the criminal defendant must show that the denial of the motion will prevent the defendant
from obtaining material and admissible evidence, that any additional witnesses can be produced
within a reasonable time, and that due diligence was exercised in preparing for case before
requesting continuance. I$L at 714. See also, State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); State v. Linden. 761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah
1988); StttC V. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985); State V, CreviSton, 646 P.2d 750, 752
(Utah 1982).
Another case in which the criminal defendant requested a continuance to obtain the
testimony of an absent witness is State v. Creviston 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982). The key witness
in this case had been charged, along with the defendant, with the selling of a controlled substance.
The witness' trial date was set after the defendant's trial was to take place and the witness did not
want to testify at the defendant's trial before her own trial took place, claiming the Fifth
Amendment. Furthermore, the defendant failed to meet the requirements for granting a
continuance by not giving the trial court an opportunity to ascertain the materiality of the
testimony. Id* at 753. The court noted that it was also questionable whether the defendant had
even exercised due diligence in ascertaining the value or availability of the witness' testimony
when moving for a continuance. Therefore, the trial court denied the motion for continuance and
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. IsL
7

A third case in which a defendant moved for continuance to procure the testimony of an
absent witness is State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985). In M i a m i the defendant asked
for a continuance, claiming he had just discovered a new witness the day before the trial.
However, the defendant had "no idea" what the testimony would be and whether the witness
should have been subpoenaed for the trial. LL at 222. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling
that the defendant did not meet the burden of showing that the testimony would be material and in
fact, was speculative.
Similarly, the standard set forth for granting a continuance is applicable to the instant case.
First, the evidence that Carter hoped to obtainfromthe absent witness, the inmate, was material
to his defense. Mr. Meek knew the victim, Joshua Irvin, and knew him to be around crystal
methamphetamine. (Supp. Tr. 2 & 3). Furthermore, Mr Meek stated that he hadfriendswho
knew Mr. Irvin much better. He stated that one of suchfriendswas owed money by Mr. Irvin for
illegal drugs. (Supp. Tr. 3). He also knew that Irvin used the crystal methamphetamine. (Supp.
Tr. 2 & 3). If the trial court had found that Irvin used illegal drugs, then this statement would
serve to corroborate Carter's testimony that Irvin was interested in purchasing some marijuana
from him. Unlike the witnesses in Creviston and Williams. Carter knew what the testimony of the
witness would be. Furthermore, with a little investigation Carter's counsel may have found more
corroborating testimony. The testimony is not speculative and is material to Carter's case in that
it would impeach Irvin's statements that he did not solicit the purchase of illegal drugs from
Carter. Furthermore, the testimony would show that Irvin was in the habit of using and
purchasing illegal drugs, a fact which he denied at trial. The statements would not be excluded
under the hearsay rule because both Irvin and the witness can be cross-examined on the
8

testimony. Therefore, the statements are material to proving Carter's innocence and are also
admissible.
The second prong of the test, that the witness could be produced within a reasonable time,
is easily met. The witness was in located at the jail, in close proximity to the courthouse. The
witness is readily available and could be produced quickly and easily, without any concern for
delay in locating him.
Third, it was unlikely that this witness would have been discovered prior to trial no matter
how much due diligence the parties' exercised. The witness came to light when codefendant Ellis
just happened to have a conversation with him at the jail after thefirstday of the trial. The
witness was not known to the parties before the trial nor was it likely that the parties could have
discovered him prior to the trial. Therefore, even though the parties exercised due diligence, the
witness had been undiscoverable until after the trial started. All three parts of the continuance
standard have been shown to the trial court. Yet the trial court denied the continuance even
though the witness' testimony was material and admissible, witness was quickly obtainable,
willing to testify, and may have made the difference in the jury verdict.
Additionally, In State v. Creviston 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982), the Court held that where
the contents of the prospective witness' testimony is speculative or likely to be inadmissible, it is
not an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance sought so that prospective witness could be
produced. However, this is not the case here. Mr. Meek's testimony was not speculative. The
witness personally knows Irvin and observed his illegal drug use. Furthermore, the testimony is
admissible to impeach Irvin's testimony and would also lend further credibility to Carter's
testimony that Irvin indeed was attempting to buy illegal drugsfromhim. Because the testimony
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of this witness is not speculative and has been shown to be admissible, the trial court should have
granted a continuance to allow defense counsel to present this witness to the court.
H.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO GRANT
CARTER A CONTINUANCE TO PROCURE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
WHICH COULD MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN THE JURY'S VERDICT.
It is a well-settled principle that the decision to grant or deny a continuance lies within the

sound discretion of the trial court. The court's decision will not be reversed unless there is a clear
abuse of that discretion. State v. Horton 848 P.2d 708, (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Oliver.
820 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert denied843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); State v. Williams.
712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1991). The trial court abused its discretion by not granting Carter a
continuance in order to investigate and procure the testimony of a newly discovered witness. For
the reasons set forth above, this witness' testimony was material and admissible, the witness was
easily obtainable within a reasonable time, and the witness was not known to the codefendants
prior to trial despite the parties' exercise of due diligence in preparing for trial. Despite the fact
that Carter met the standard set forth by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals
for granting a continuance, the trial court still denied his motion for a brief continuance. This
denial constitutes an abuse of the court's discretion and should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court denied Carter's motion for continuance even though the testimony of a
newly discovered witness could prove his innocence. The Utah Courts have set forth a standard
in which the burden is on the defendant to prove that a continuance should be granted in light of
newly discovered evidence. In Carter's case, it was the discovery of a witness, an inmate, who
knew Irvin, the man who accused Carter of pickpocketing.
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This witness is able to provide testimony as to Irvin's use and purchase of illegal drugs.
This testimony is material to Carter's case because it turns Irvin's story around, from a case of
two black men picking his pocket for no good reason, to a story of a drug deal gone sour.
Furthermore, this witness would corroborate Carter's version of what happened between the two
men. There is nothing to corroborate Irvin's version other than his statements in court. In asking
the trial court for a continuance, Carter has met the burden of showing that the testimony is
material and admissible, that the witness can be easily procured, and that even though due
diligence had been exercised prior to trial, the witness had been undiscoverable until after the trial
began. By not granting a brief continuance to allow the parties' counsel to investigate and obtain
the witness' testimony, the trial court abused its discretion and has allowed an injustice to occur.
This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling denying Carter's motion for continuance.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ? day of October, 1997.

T^J'

A.Freestone
Frees
Wayne>A.
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
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